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Summary findings
In seeking funding, a firm's main choice is between  To the extent that these findings for India are
external and interna; financing. And, says Samuel, the  generalizable to other developing countries - analysis
evidence suggests that the stock market plays only a  was restricted to the stock market's role in providing
limited role providing finance for both U.S. and Indian  finance - Samuel concludes that the development of
firms.  stock markets is unlikely to spur corporate growth in
Samuel finds that internal finance plays less of a role  developing countries. (Why, then, he wonders, do firm
for Indian firms than for U.S. firms - and external debt  managers worry so much about share prices?)
a bigger role. This is consistent with theoretical  And there's a caveat: Foreign investors have played
predictions, given that information and agency problems  only a limited role in the slow-paced privatization of
are less severe for Indian firms than for U.S. firms.  India's state-owned enterprises - although in recent
(India's financial system is predominantly  bank-oriented,  years, despite delayed reform of the securities market,
more like German and Japanese financial systems than  foreign institutional investors have begun to invest more.
like American and British systems.)  In emerging markets in Eastern Europe and Latin
Samuel's estimate of the role of the stock market as a  America, foreign investors have played a much more
source of finance is lower than  other estimates, partly  active role in privatization, chiefly by investing in those
because of methodological approach:  He studied sources  stock markets.
and uses of funds, rather than the financing of net asset
growth and capital expenditures.
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of this paper.The stock market as a source of fmance: A comparison  of U.S. and Indian firms
In a market economy, the stock market performs three basic functions: (i) a source for
financing investment; (ii) a signalling  mechanism to managers regarding  investment decisions;
and (iii) a catalyst for corporate  governance. This paper analyzes  the financing  practices of U.S.
and Indian firms with regard to sources and uses of funds, based on their balance sheets.'  The
primary objective of the study is to pinpoint the role of the stock market in financing firm
expenditures. The analysis in this paper is based on data for an aggregate  of firms in the U.S.
and India.  The paper is divided into two main sections.  Section  I outlines the analytical  issues
and Section II presents and discusses  the empirical results.
-'-
There are several reasons for undertaking  a comparative  analysis of sources and uses of
funds for Indian and U.S.  firms.  For one, India is one of the fastest-growing  emerging stock
markets. In fact, India has the second  largest number of listed firms on its stock exchanges  after
the U.S., though the Indian stock  market is much smaller than several  others in terms of market
capitalization. It  is  also interesting to explore corporate finance issues in  the context of  a
developing  country like India from a theoretical  perspective,  even as a pure comparative exercise
in scholarship, especially given the extensive research on corporate finance for the U.S..2
There are a number of interesting  issues that can be posed in a study of sources and uses
of funds. For instance, what is the relationship  between the different  components  of the sources
l Samuel  (1995a)  deals  with  the signalling  role of the market  and  Samuel  (1996a)  deals  with  the
governance  role of the market.
2  Based  on International  Finance  Corporation's  (IFC)  recent  project  on corporate  financial  patterns
in industrializing  countries, Singh  and  Hamid  (1992)  and Singh  (1995)  have  studied  India and other
developing  countries.and uses of finance, especially  the role of the stock market as a source of finance? What about
the  mix  between internal  and external  sources of  finance and  the  mix between capital
expenditures  and other uses of funds?
The central issue regarding finance for the firm is its composition  between intemal and
external sources. While retained  eamings and depreciation are the main components  of intemal
finance, debt and equity are the two components  of extemal finance. Cash flows are defined as
the sum of retained earnings and depreciation.  Throughout  this paper, the terms cash flows and
internal finance are used interchangeably.
Stock market contribution
As pointed out by Mayer (1988), there are two sources of information for studying
aggregate  corporate financing  patterns in different countries. The first is national flow-of-funds
statements  that record flows  between different sectors of an economy  and between domestic  and
overseas  residents. The second  source is company  accounts  that  are constructed  on an individual
firm basis but are often aggregated  or extrapolated to industry or economy  levels.
Both sources have their advantages  and disadvantages. In theory, flow-of-funds  statistics
provide comprehensive  coverage  of transactions between sectors.  Company accounts  are only
available for a sample, often quite small, of a country's corporate sector.  However, the data
that are  employed in  company accounts are  usually more reliable than flow-of-funds.  In
particular, flow-of-funds are constructed from a variety of different sources that are rarely
consistent.  As a result, statistical  adjustments  are required to reconcile entries. 3
3  See also Corbett  and Jenkinson  (1994)  for a comparative  discussion  of using flow-of-funds  and
company  accounts.
2This paper is based on company  accounts. The analysis  of sources and uses of funds has
been done by looking at changes in  the balance sheet items over time; a summary of this
approach is shown in Table 1.  The principal reason for adopting the balance sheet-based
approach to the study of source and uses of funds is to facilitate the comparison of U.S. and
Indian firms.  The basic idea behind the balance sheet approach is that the firm's sources of
funds come from decreases  in assets and increases in liabilities  while the uses of funds take  place
through increases in assets and decreases in liabilities.
As noted earlier, the measure of internal finance used in this paper is reserves and
surplus (retained earnings)  plus depreciation  (table 1). The measure of stock  market contribution
or external finance (equity)  used here is based on changes  in the firm's paid-up  capital  emanating
from changes in the number of shares as well as the price of shares.
However, it should  be noted that there is another approach in the literature, following
Prais  (1976),  that measures internal finance as  retained earnings net of  depreciation and
compares it to net capital expenditures. 4 This approach is useful  if the focus is on studying  the
financing of the growth of the firm in terms of net capital expenditures. This paper however
has a different focus and examines  the broader issue of total sources and uses of funds for the
firm and therefore considers depreciation as a source of funds for the firm and compares it to
the firm's gross capital  expenditures. 5 In other words, replacement  investment  is considered  as
another use of funds by the firm.  As noted by Prais (1976), one important  consequence  of this
differential treatment of depreciation  is that internal finance would me much more important  if
4 Singh and Hamid (1992)  and Singh (1995) among others follow this approach.
Mayer (1988, 1990), Corbett and Jenkinson (1994), and Samuel  (1995b) also adopt this
approach.
3depreciation is counted  as a source of finance than when depreciation  is not counted  as a source
of finance, since depreciation  is such a large item on both sides of the account  when it is counted
as a source of finance.
As  a  starting point,  it is  useful to  note the  results of  Mayer  (1988,  1990), who
investigated  the corporate financing  patterns for the U.S., UK, Japan, Germany, France, Italy,
Canada, and Finland for the 1970 to 1985 period based on the flow of funds accounts  of these
countries. The main findings  of Mayer (1988, 1990)  are: (i) retentions are the dominant  source
of finance in all countries; (ii) corporations do not raise a substantial amount of finance from
the stock market in any one country; and (iii) banks are the dominant source of external finance
in all countries, especially in France, Italy, and Japan.
These results can also be compared with that of Samuel (1995b),  based on the cash flow
statements of 533 U.S.  manufacturing  firms for the 1972-1987  period.  The main findings of
Samuel (1995a)  are: (i) the financing  hierarchy hypothesis  is broadly supported when the sources
and uses of funds analysis is conducted  on a gross as well as net basis; 6 (ii) on a net basis, the
contribution of equity  to the total sources of funds is negative; (iii) firms issue debt and equity
to retire existing commitments  rather than to finance capital expenditures, which appears to be
done primarily through  internal  finance; and (iv) external  finance  plays a limited  role with regard
to capital expenditures.
Investment theories and the role of finance
The next issue to  consider  is the predictions  of the alternative  theories of investment
According  to the financing  hierarchy (pecking  order) hypothesis, the firm's preference  for sources
of finance run from internal finance to debt to equity. This is discussed in greater detail later on.
4regarding  sources of  finance.7 The neoclassical theory  of investment  is based in  part on  the
Modigliani-Miller  (1958) theorems in finance. The neoclassical view assumes that as long as the
firm  has  profitable  investments  with  returns  above the cost  of  capital,  the firm  can  obtain
sufficient  funds to undertake  them.  Consequently,  internal and external finance are viewed as
substitutes;  firms  could  use  external  finance  to  smooth  investment  when  internal  finance
fluctuates. More generally, the neoclassical view also implies a complete dichotimization of the
real and financial decisions  faced by the firm.
On the other hand, cash flow theories of investment--information-theoretic and managerial
approaches--emphasize financing  hierarchy faced by the firm wherein the firm's  preference for
sources  of finance is internal finance,  debt, and equity, in that order  and therefore  cash flows
become  critical  in  capital  expenditure  decisions. 8 For  instance,  the  information-theoretic
approach  to investment explicitly  considers capital market imperfections  that raise the cost of
external  finance;  managerial  discretion  considerations  lead  to  a  similar  outcome  in  the
managerial  theory of investment.
Managerial  theory  of investment
The  managerial  approach  to corporate  behavior  directly challenges  the assumption  of
profit  maximization by  the firm  and  instead postulates  other  objectives  such as sales,  staff,
'  The  alternative theories of  investment are:  accelerator, cash  flow,  neoclassical, modified
neoclassical,  and Q. While  the accelerator  theory  emphasizes  output as the principal  determinant  of capital
expenditures,  neoclassical  theory emphasizes  cost of capital,  modified  neoclassical  theory  emphasizes  cost
of capital and output, cash flow theory emphasizes  internal  finance, and the Q theory emphasizes  the q
ratio (Tobin's Q)--the ratio of market value of the firm to its replacement  cost. The focus here is on the
cash flow theory and its contrast with the neoclassical  model.
S There have been numerous studies that have shown that internal finance is the most important
determinant of investment  decisions. See Kuh (1963)  for early evidence  and Fazzari et al. (1988) and
others for recent evidence.
5emoluments,  market share etc.,  for managers.9 Given the separation  of ownership and control
(management),  managerial  behavior  is  discretionary  and  constrained  rather  weakly  by
shareholder-owner  interests on the one hand, and by competitive market conditions on the other.
The key result of the managerial approach is that firms aim for greater output levels and
faster  growth  than  is  consistent  with  maximizing  the  current  stock  market  value  of  the
corporation,  taken as a proxy  for stockholder welfare.  The extent of managerial discretion  to
do  this  depends  upon a  minimum profit  constraint  imposed  by  the capital  market,  or  upon
sustaining a market value high enough to forestall a disciplinary takeover bid in the market for
corporate  control.
In the managerial  theory of the firm,  the fundamental determinant  of investment is the
availability of internal finance.  Managers  are envisaged as pushing  investment programs  to a
point where  their marginal rate of return is below the level  that would maximize  stockholder
welfare;  in  other  words,  managers  indulge  in  overinvestment.  For  these purposes,  internal
finance is particularly  favored since they are the most accessible part of the capital market and
most amenable to managerial desires for growth.  In other words,  professional managers avoid
relying on the external finance because it would subject them to the discipline of the external
capital  market.  In  contrast,  the level  of  cash  flow is  irrelevant  for  the  firm's  investment
decisions in neoclassical theory;  what matters is the cost of capital.
9  Strictly speaking, the managerial theory of investment  can be thought of as being made up of two
types of approaches--managerial  capitalism and agency theory.  Baumol (1959, 1967), Marris (1964),
Grabowski and Mueller (1972) and others are examples of the managerial capitalism  approach.  The
agency  cost approach  focusses  on contracting  aspects  within  the overall framework  of the principal-agent
model and is associated  with Jensen and Meckling  (1976) and others.
6Information-theoretic  approach
In asymmetric information models, firm managers or insiders are assumed to possess
private  information about  the  characteristics of  the  firm's  return  stream or  investment
opportunities. Myers and Majluff (1984) showed that, if outside suppliers of capital are less
well-informed  than insiders about the value  of the firm's assets, equity  may be mispriced  by the
market.  In particular, the market may associate new equity issues with low-quality  firms.  If
firms are required to finance new projects by issuing equity, underpricing  may  be so severe that
new investors capture more than the Net Present Value (NPV) of the new project, resulting in
a net loss to existing shareholders. In this case, the project will be rejected even if its NPV is
positive. This underinvestment  can be avoided if the firm can finance the new project using a
security that is not so severely undervalued  by the market. For example, internal funds and/or
riskless debt  involve no undervaluation,  and therefore, will be preferred to equity. Myers (1984)
refers to this as a "pecking  order" theory of financing, i.e.,  that capital structure will be driven
by firms' desire to finance new investments,  first internally, then  with low-risk debt, and finally
with equity only as a last resort.
Based on  these  considerations, the information-theoretic approach to  the  study of
investment  also implies a positive relationship  between cash flows and investment;  in fact, this
positive relationship  is also seen as evidence  of liquidity constraints faced by firms.
Given these  considerations, external finance and  internal finance are  not  perfect
substitutes for  the  firm,  as  predicted by  the Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorems and  the
neoclassical theory of investment. Therefore, in a  world of  heterogenous firms,  financing
constraints  would clearly influence  the investment  decisions of firms. In particular, investment
7may depend on financial  factors, such as the availability  of internal finance, access to new debt
or equity finance, or the functioning of particular credit markets.
Discussion
(i) In cash flow models, intemal finance is generally viewed as a constraint on the volume of
investment expenditures  rather than as a determinant of the optimal capital stock. Therefore,
there is no role for capital-labor  substitution  in these models, unlike the neoclassical  model  of
investment.
(ii) It is often difficult to distinguish between the role of cash flow as a measure of the expected
profitability of investment  from its role as a measure  of the availability  of funds for investment.
It is this latter aspect that is generally  intended  for measurement,  and through which  the liquidity
effect is thought to operate. In the information-theoretic  approach for instance, an increase in
cash flow would increase investment. However, since increases in cash flow are likely to be
highly correlated with increases in profitability, it is hard to tell if the increased investment  is
not primarily the result of increased profitability  rather than increased cash flow. One solution-
proposed by Fazzari et al. (1988)--is  to use the q ratio as a measure of the expected  profitability
and cash flows as a measure of the availability  of funds.
(iii) Even though the information-theoretic  approach assumes the prevalence of capital market
constraints and financing hierarchy, it is cast in  a neoclassical framework with the usual
assumption that  managers act in  the  interests of  shareholders and  maximize profits and
shareholder  value. On the other hand, managerial  theory is based on the premise that managers
have objectives different from those of shareholders. Managers do not maximize profits and
shareholder  wealth, but instead maximize  the growth  rate/size of the firm and are probably  more
8concerned about managerial  perquisites.
(iv) In the information-theoretic  approach, it is assumed  that funds are invested at rates of return
above shareholder opportunity costs.  This is an outcome  of the assumption that managers act
in the interests of shareholders. In the managerial  model however, investment  could take place
at rates of returns below opportunity cost." 0 This is because managers have objectives  that are
different from those of shareholders. Therefore, the policy implications of the two approaches
are  drastically different. In particular, overinvestment by  managers is  not an issue in the
information-theoretic  approach, while it is a matter of central concern in the managerial  theory.
These  considerations also  have important implications for  the efficiency of  the  resource
allocation process implied by the two theories.
(v) In  the  information-theoretic  view, a  financing hierarchy exists because of asymmetric
information between managers  and outside suppliers  of finance. As demonstrated  by Myers and
Majluff (1984), firms are faced with a skeptical  capital  market that pays less for new  equity than
its true value, since the market cannot fully learn the expected  return on the firm's investment.
In the managerial  view however, financing hierarchy exists because managers can use internal
funds at their discretion  and are hence exempt from the discipline  of the external capital  market.
(vi) The central issue in the managerial theory of investment is the prevalence of managerial
discretion. Consequently,  internal finance becomes  important  for investment  decisions. On the
other hand, the information-theoretic  approach  to investment  emphasizes  the role of information
asymmetries  and essentially  views managerial  discretion  as an aspect  of asymmetric  information.
10 See Mueller  and Reardon  (1993)  for recent evidence.  Brainard  et al. (1980)  also found that
substantial  volume  of investment  in the U.S. economy  had been undertaken below the opportunity  cost
of capital,  which  is inconsistent  with  the predictions  of the neoclassical  theory.
9Therefore, internal  finance  is important  for investment  because of the prevalence  of information
asymmetries.  In other words, the firm's reliance on internal finance is due to information
problems as well as agency costs.  The common ground between the two approaches  lies in
recognizing  the fact that it is the separation  of ownership  and control that generates  information
asymmetries in the first instance, which in turn leads to discretionary managerial  behavior.
(vii) It is interesting  to note that, starting with the work of Fazzari et al. (1988), the consensus
in  the  literature on  the cash  flow  theory of investment appears to  be  that the principal
explanation  for the observed  positive relationship  between internal finance and investment  is the
presence of asymmetries  of information. In contrast, this paper takes exception  to this view and
argues that the cash flow theory of investment is also driven by managerial considerations.
However, this paper does not attempt to distinguish between the information-theoretic  and
managerial approaches  on the basis of observed firm characteristics, since firm-level data was
not available for India." 1
External  Vs Internal rmance
In the context of the firm's choice between internal and external finance, Koch (1943),
Donaldson (1961), and others have documented  the existence  of financing hierarchy, wherein
the firm's preferred ordering of the sources of finance  is: (i) internal finance; (ii) external  debt;
and (iii) new equity.
As discussed before, the firm's reliance on internal finance could be rationalized  from
at least two theoretical  perspectives: (i) managerial  approach which emphasizes agency costs
" Oliner  and Rudebusch  (1993)  and Samuel  (1996b)  distinguish  between  information-theoretic  and
managerial  approaches  based  on firm-level  data for U.S. manufacturing  firms.
10stemming from the separation  of ownership  from control  and the importance of internal finance
since internal finance facilitates managerial  discretion; and (ii) information-thneolefic  approacXx
which emphasizes asymmetries in  information between insiders (managers) and outsiders
(suppliers of capital) and the consequent  credit rationing faced by firms.
Starting with Baumol et al. (1970), there has been a large literature on the related issue
of rates of returns to alternative sources of finance for the firm.  The emphasis  in these studies
has been in looking  at the changes in rates of return on alternative  sources of finance  for a given
firm over time; not really in terms of different  types of firms.  One exception  has been the life-
cycle approach  due to Grabowski and Mueller (1975), where the focus in fact shifts to types of
firms from the sources  of finance; based on life-cycle  and technology  considerations,  firms are
classified as being either mature or dynamic.
One  interesting  finding from these  rates of return studies has been the observed  hierarchy
in returns, with the returns rising from internal  finance  to new debt and new equity. Thereafter,
one strand of the literature has gone on to compare  the firm's rate of return to the cost of capital
for alternative  sources of finance and establish  the fact that in a substantial  segment  of the U.S.
corporate sector, investments have taken place at rates of return below the cost of capital and
that  this  reflects the  prevalence of  considerable managerial discretion regarding capital
expenditures.  12
An alternative  interpretation of this finding is to recognize that hierarchy in returns is
precisely what one expects from the assumption of the firm facing a  financing hierarchy,
wherein the cost of finance rises from internal finance  to new debt to new equity. After all, the
12 See Mueller  and  Reardon  (1993)  for instance.
11cost of capital and the required rate of return are two sides of the same coin.  In fact, in a world
of perfect capital  markets, the rate of return should  always equal the cost of capital. Therefore,
these findings  of a hierarchy in returns connote a clear rejection of the perfect capital markets
paradigm wherein  the rates of returns are predicted  to be the same across alternative  sources of
finance.  This hierarchy in returns can also be viewed as consistent with the prediction of the
cash flow theories that firms that use external capital markets should attain higher returns on
investment than firms that do not use external capital markets.
As noted by Lyon (1992), firms with access  to sufficient  internal funds or extemal funds
without significant agency costs may be able to undertake all investment opportunities with
positive net present value.  Other firms, however, may face a divergence between  the required
return on intemal funds and that required on extemal funds due to asymmetric  information. In
this case, investment opportunities  which would  be profitable to undertake with internal funds
may not yield sufficient  retums to allow extemal financing. Investment is misallocated  because
projects with high marginal retums may not receive financing, while projects with lower
marginal returns are undertaken. Further, the wrong amount  of investment  may be undertaken.
In other words, the presence of financing  hierarchy leads to overall inefficiency  in the resource
allocation process.
In the context of the discussion  of internal  vs extemal finance, it is also useful  to consider
the debt and equity elements of extemal finance separately.  As shown by Myers and Majluff
(1984), the existence of information asymmetries  between suppliers of finance and managers
could discourage firms from issuing equity  and force them to forgo positive NPV projects and
therefore lead to underinvestment. Similar considerations  may also apply with regard to risky
12securities such as debt. However, at modest  levels of borrowing, debt is comparatively  low risk
and there is less negative information  associated  with issues of debt than equity. External debt
finance is therefore used in preference to external equity.  New equity issues are restricted to
the funding of projects for which there are inadequate  internal sources of retention finance and
external sources of low risk debt finance  are unavailable. This also suggests a "pecking  order"
of corporate finance in which internal finance is used in preference to debt issues and debt is
issued in preference to external equity issues.
Greenwald  et al. (1984) also postulate the existence of a tradeoff between issuing risky
debt and equity  depending  on the degree that  the returns of the firm are dependent  on managerial
effort and the scope the firm has to undertake  projects with different degrees of risk.  When the
former is dominant, debt is the optimal instrument. Where the latter is dominant,  equity is the
optimal instrument.  In  between, mixtures of debt and equity may minimize the costs of
asymmetric  information.
Financial slack
The firm's choice between internal and external finance is also related to the notion of
fmancial slack (FS) defined as
Financial slack  =  Internal  finance - Capital expenditures.
This notion of financial slack  is similar  to the notion in Stein (1989)  where financial  slack
is defined  as "cash  reserves or flows that permit it (firm) to fund its investments  without  having
to issue new stock".  The definition used here is somewhat  broader and addresses the issue of
how far the firm can avoid external finance in general while undertaking capital expenditures.
Building financial  slack essentially allows firms to fund capital expenditures  without recourse
13to external finance and allows managers to effectively insulate themselves  from the constant
scrutiny  of capital markets; this is also known  as the "capital market pressure" hypothesis  in the
literature. In other words, the higher the level of financial slack, the lower the level of capital
market pressure.  Based on case studies, Donaldson (1961) found financial  slack to be a major
strategic  goal of firms.  One rationale  for the existence  of financial slack  is the lemons  premium
associated  with new equity issues, as shown  by Myers and Majluff (1984). However, it should
be noted that Myers and Majluff (1984)  define financial slack slightly differently. They define
financial  slack as the sum of cash on hand and marketable securities.
Financial slack could also be based on considerations of managerial  discretion  in that it
allows managers  to be more reliant on internal  finance  where the scope  for managerial  discretion
is maximum. In other words, the higher the level of financial slack, the greater the likely role
of internal finance in firm expenditures. Positive financial slack, as defined here, implies that
internal finance exceeds capital expenditures.
An overview of Indian corporate  rmance
Broadly speaking, economies  can be characterized as being either stock  market-oriented
or bank-oriented.' 3 Traditionally, the UK and U.S.  economies have been regarded as being
stock market-oriented while Japanese and German economies are  regarded as being bank-
oriented.  Apriori, one could expect agency costs and information  problems to be lower in a
bank-oriented system than in a stock market-oriented system." 4 Therefore, internal finance
13 See  Allen  (1993),  Porter  (1992),  and Stiglitz  (1992)  for a more  detailed  discussion.
14 See Samuel  (1995b)  for a more detailed  discussion  of the relationship  between  agency  costs,
information  problems,  and firm  financing  choices.
14should be less important in a bank-oriented  system than in a stock market-oriented  system."
In this framework, India can be considered a bank-oriented  system. As noted by Bhatt
(1994), the lead bank system in India is similar to the universal  banks in Germany  and the main
bank system in Japan.  In the late 1960s, India devised three types of lead banks with a view
to raising  the rate of financial  savings, allocating  financial  resources to the most  productive uses,
and improving the investment  and productive  efficiency  of assisted  enterprises. The three types
of lead banks in India are:  (i) lead development bank for investment financing" 6;  (ii) lead
commercial  bank for working capital finance; and (iii) lead commercial  bank in a district for
providing bank finance to small enterprises.
In  practice  however,  the  lead  development bank  system in  India  has  not  fully
accomplished  its goals of promoting efficient  import substitution  and export promotion because
of deficiencies in:  (i) project appraisal and evaluation; (ii) monitoring and  supervision of
projects; and (iii) mechanisms  to anticipate  problems and take a proactive  role in tackling them
through managerial, technical, and/or financial  assistance  in time to projects/enterprises which
did not perform as well as anticipated  at the time of project appraisal. The primary reason for
the lack of adequate  monitoring  of enterprises has been the failure of the lead development  bank
to evolve  mechanisms  of coordination  with the commercial  banks, who  typically  provide working
capital finance in  the Indian context.  Likewise, the lead commercial bank system has not
"  The evidence  in Mayer  (1988,  1990)  and  Corbett  and  Jenkinson  (1994)  are  broadly  consistent  with
this.
16  There are three all-India development  banks: Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI),
Industrial  Finance Corporation  of India (FCI), and Industrial  Credit and Investment  Corporation  of India
(ICICI).  At the state level, practically each state has a State Financial  Corporation (SFC) and a State
Industrial  Development  Corporation (SIDC).
15attained its objectives due to  the absence of an institutional framework for coordination of
decision making among banks and the presence of the classic free rider problem with regard to
the monitoring of borrower activities. 17 Lastly, the lead bank system for district development
has performed poorly with regard to appraisal, monitoring, and supervision  of assisted small
enterprises in the farm and non-farm  sector. In addition, given that the overall institutional and
policy framework in India has been significantly  different from that of Japan, the end result of
the  lead bank  system in  India  has been quite  different,  even  though it  shared  several
characteristics  of the Japanese main  bank system. Another  crucial difference  between the Indian
and Japanese and German financial  system is that commercial  banks in India do not own equity
in corporations. However, Indian development  banks do hold significant  equity stakes in firms.
In addition, the term finance provided by these development  banks can be converted to equity
under certain circumstances.  In the past, this has proved to be controversial  in context of the
market for corporate control in certain instances.
Comparative analysis
As stated before, this paper compares the financing patterns of Indian and U.S. firms.
One implication  of the discussion  above is that, apriori, one would  expect intemal finance to be
less important than external finance as a source of finance for Indian firms compared to U.S.
firms since information problems and agency costs are likely to be lesser for Indian firms
compared  to U.S. firms, given that India has a bank-oriented  financial  system compared to the
stock market-oriented  system in the U.S..
" In contrast,  IDBI  has devised  an informal  institution  called  Inter-institutional  Meeting  (IIM)  to
coordinate  the functions  of all-India  development  banks.
16-II-
(1) Sample details
The empirical analysis  presented  in this paper for the U.S. is based on the balance sheets
of  a  panel  of  510  firms  for  the  1972-1992 period,  taken from  Standard and  Poor's
COMPUSTAT data base; the  sample excludes firms that were involved in  major mergers
representing contribution to sales exceeding  50 percent of the acquiring firm's net sales for the
year in question.  The sample includes industrial firms belonging to manufacturing  as well as
non-manufacturing  sectors that are quoted on the major stock exchanges or over-the-counter.
When firms go public initially, their stock is issued over the counter, as they usually cannot
meet the listing requirements of major exchanges."
In the case of Indian firms, data has been taken from Reserve Bank of India's  (RBI)
publication titled  "Report on Currency and Finance" and Industrial Credit and Investment
Corporation  of India's (ICICI) publication  titled "Financial  Performance  of Companies"  for the
1972-1993  period.  As in the case of the U.S., the Indian data too refers to industrial firms that
are engaged in  manufacturing  as well as non-manufacturing  activities.  However, unlike the
U.S., the Indian data includes firms that are not quoted on the stock exchanges.
In the case of the U.S. as well as Indian firms, the data on sources and uses of funds
have been derived from their balance sheets.  With regard to the issue of the size of the firm,
the sample  used in this paper for both countries  covers the whole range of the size distribution.
In the case of the RBI data, there is a distinction  between medium and large firms, based on
1s  Listing requirements for the New York Stock Exchange currently include: a corporation  must
have a minimum of one million publicly held shares with a minimum  aggregate  market value of $16
million as well as net income  topping  $2.5 million  before federal income  tax.
17paid-up  capital. Medium firms have  been defined as firms with paid-up  capital up to Rs. 5 lakhs
(table 2), while large firms are firms with paid-up capital of Rs.  1 crore and more (table 3).
The ICICI data relates to medium  as well as large firms (table 4).
(11)  Financing patterns
(a) Indian data
(i) RBI data
Sources and uses of funds: RBI data on medium and large firms for the 1972-1991 period
(table 2) suggest that on an average, internal finance contributed about 42 percent  of total  funds
and external finance the remaining  58 percent.  While external equity made up about 4 percent
of all funds, long-term borrowing contributed 29 percent.  With regard to the uses of funds,
gross fixed assets accounted for about 50 percent of the funds used.
The data for the large firms shown in table 3 reveal a similar picture.  While internal
finance provided about 38 percent of the funds, external finance made up the remaining 62
percent.  While external equity contributed  6 percent of total funds, long-term borrowing made
up 33 percent of total funds.
It is interesting to note that in the case of medium as well as large firms, the evidence
in tables 5 and 6 suggest that external  finance  has become  more important  in the 1980s  compared
to the 1970s. This finding  is consistent  with the result of Roy and Sen (1994)  based on national
accounts  and flow of funds accounts  for the 1970-1989  period.' 9 Further, tables 2 and 3 suggest
that the increasing importance  of external finance is due to debt as well as equity; in particular,
19 This is also consistent  with  the evidence  of Roy  Choudhury  (1992).  Based  on data  for the 1955-56
to 1986-87  period,  Roy Choudhury  (1992)  has concluded  that  the dependence  of the private  corporate
sector  on external  funds  for investment  has continued  and increased.
18equity has  become  more important after  1987, consistent with the overall  boom in the Indian
stock market  during  this time.
(ii) ICICI data
Sources  and  uses of funds:  The results based on ICICI's  portfolio of firms tell a similar story
(table 4).  For the  1978-1993 period,  internal finance provided about 38 percent of total funds
while external  finance provided the remaining  62 percent.  The ICICI data is  somewhat more
useful than the RBI data in that it provides more disaggregated information on the components
of external  finance.  While external equity provided  5 percent of funds, debentures provided 9
percent,  long-term  borrowing  from financial institutions  (FIs)  13 percent,  bank borrowing  for
working capital  8 percent,  and creditors  18 percent. 20 With regard to the uses of funds, gross
fixed assets accounted for about 54 percent  of the total uses of funds by these firms.
(iii) A comparison
It is interesting to compare these findings for India with that of Singh (1995),  shown in
Table 5.  In general,  Singh (1995) found that, compared to firms in advanced countries,  firms
in developing  countries financed the growth of net assets from internal sources  to a far smaller
degree.  In particular,  Indian companies seem to rely much more on external equity finance for
their growth  compared  to Anglo-Saxon firms  today.  For instance,  in the case of the top  100
Indian  manufacturing  firms  for  the  1980-90 period,  external  equity contributed  to  about 20
percent of the growth of the average firm.  This is significantly higher than the estimates shown
I  In addition to IFCI, ICICI, and IDBI, Industrial Reconstruction  Bank of India (IRBI)  also provides
long-term finance to Indian corporations. Unit trust of India (UTI), Life Insurance  Corporation  of India
(LIC), and General  Insurance  Corporation  of India (GIC)  also provide financial  assistance  and take equity
positions in Indian companies. In addition, there are state-level  financial  institutions  (SFCs, SIDCs)  that
provide long-tern finance to Indian companies.
19in tables 2, 3, and 4, even though the estimates for the shares of internal and external finance
are broadly similar. This finding  of similar estimates  for internal  finance  in this study and Singh
(1995) is surprising in that, apriori, the Prais (1976) method is expected to lead to smaller
estimates for internal finance since depreciation is netted out from both sources and uses of
funds.
In other words, the estimates  presented in this study differ from Singh (1995) with regard
to the components  of external  finance,  i.e.,  debt and equity, and these differences  stem primarily
from methodological issues.  For  one,  Singh (1995) follows Prais  (1976) and  compares
retentions net of depreciation  with net capital expenditures. Also, the analysis in Singh (1995)
is posed in terms of financing  of net assets, i.e.,  total assets less current liabilities, and external
equity is derived as a residual, as (1-internal finance-external  debt).  One problem with this
approach relates to  the treatment of  non-current liabilities that are not considered debt or
equity. 2"  Once current liabilities are removed as a source of finance, since the issue is posed
as the financing of net assets--total  assets less current liabilities--, debt, equity, and non-current
(other) liabilities are the other sources of finance.  If external equity is derived as a residual,
i.e.,  (1-internal finance-debt), non-current liabilities get counted as part of this estimate of
external equity.  Altematively, if external debt is derived as residual, i.e.,  (1-internal finance-
external equity), non-current  liabilities  would be counted  as part of this estimate of external debt.
Therefore, if external equity or debt is derived as residual, it is likely to be an overestimate
since non-current liabilities  would form part of it.  As discussed  in detail before, the approach
21 For the U.S. firms,  these  liabilities  include:  (i) Liabilities-other;  (ii)  Deferred  taxes  and  investment
tax credit;  and  (iii)  Minority  interest.  For the  Indian  firms,  non-current  liabilities  include  other  liabilities.
20used in this study is distinctly  different from the residual approach  in Singh and Hamid (1992)
and Singh (1995). The divergence in estimates  for extemal equity  for Indian firms reported in
this paper and the estimates  in Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995) is on account  of these
methodological  differences.  In this context, it is interesting to note that equity estimates for
Korea and Turkey by other researchers are lower than the estimates  in Singh and Hamid (1992)
and Singh (1995).2  Also, given these considerations, the estimates  reported in this study are
not strictly comparable  to the estimates in Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995).
(b) U.S.  data
Sources and uses of funds: COMPUSTAT data for the U.S.  (table 6) suggests that for the
1972-92  period, on an average  internal finance provided about  52 percent of the total funds and
external finance provided the remaining 48 percent.  While external equity provided 4 percent
of total funds, long-term borrowing provided 10 percent. These results for U.S. firms are also
consistent with the findings of Samuel (1995a).
Comparative  analysis of Indian and U.S. firms
Table 7 summarizes  the evidence  presented above for Indian and U.S.  firms.  Based on
the analysis of sources and uses of funds, it is clear that Indian firms are far less dependent  on
internal finance than U.S. firms and more dependent  on external finance.  Within here, there
are some interesting  differences  between the components  of external  finance for Indian and U.S.
firms (see tables 2, 3, 4, 6).  While external debt, debentures,  and creditors are more important
for Indian firms, other current liabilities are more important for U.S.  firms.  Interestingly
enough, the contribution  of external equity as a source of finance is broadly similar for Indian
X For Korea,  see Cho (1995)  and for Turkey,  see  Sak (1995).
21and U.S.  firms.  In other words,  while the role of the stock market  as a source  of finance is
broadly similar for Indian and U.S.  firms, internal finance is less important for Indian firms than
U.S.  firms.  The fundamental difference between Indian and U.S.  firms stems from the role that
external debt plays as a source of finance; it is much more important for Indian firms than U.S.
firms.  It is in this sense that the Indian financial system can be termed  as a bank-oriented one.
Also,  the figures  for  total  borrowings  in  tables 2,  3,  and  4 bring  out  some distinct
features of Indian corporate finance.  Total borrowings of Indian firms have three components:
(i) term-loans  from  development banks;  (ii) debentures;  and  (iii) working  capital loans  from
commercial banks.  For the  U.S.  firms however (table 6), borrowings consist of debentures and
long-term borrowings from other bond issues. 3 Therefore, the fundamental difference between
Indian and U.S.  firms with regard to borrowings  relates to the role and nature of development
banks in the Indian context.
To  summarize,  these patterns  in the sources  and uses of  funds do  suggest that Indian
firms  are dependent  on internal  finance to a  far smaller degree  than their  U.S.  counterparts.
Consequently,  Indian firms are far more dependent on external finance than U.S.  firms.  These
results  are therefore  consistent with the prediction of internal finance being less important for
Indian firms  than U.S.  firms and external finance being more important  for Indian firms than
U.S.  firms,  given  that  information  and  agency  problems  are  less  severe  for  Indian  firms
compared to U.S.  firms,  since the Indian financial system is predominantly  a bank-oriented one.
'  Unfortunately, COMPUSTAT does not  provide the details of  working capital loans from
commercial  banks for U.S. firms.
22(c) Other aspects of Indian capital markets
(i) Financing of project  costs: In addition  to the RBI and ICICI data on company  finances,  RBI
provides detailed information  on the financing of project costs.  It is interesting to analyze  this
data as a consistency  check on the robustness of the results reported above.  However, it is
important to note at the outset that this data refers only to capital expenditures  and not all uses
of funds as was the case earlier. Therefore, these  patterns in financing of project costs are more
amenable to a direct comparison with the estimates  provided by Singh (1995) and Singh and
Hamid (1992) for Indian firms.  Based on considerations  outlined earlier, apriori, one would
expect the stock market to play a more important  role as a source of finance in the financing  of
capital expenditures compared to its role in all uses of funds.
Tables 8, 9, 10 provide details of financing  of project costs by new, existing, and all
Indian firms for the 1971-1993  period; however, the breakdown  between new and existing  firms
is available only for the 1971-1984  period.  These trends can best be summarized  by looking  at
the patterns for the 1971-1993  period for all firms (table 10).  While internal finance  provided
6 percent of all project costs, external equity, debentures,  loans from banks, and loans from FIs
provided  33 percent, 9 percent, 11 percent, and 28 percent respectively.  These results are
therefore consistent with the previous finding that internal finance is less important for Indian
firms than external finance. Also, external debt plays a bigger role than external equity, even
though the 33 percent figure for external equity as a source of finance for project costs is
significantly higher than the 5 percent figure for external  equity as a source of finance  that was
found earlier.  This difference could be due to two factors.  First, unlike the earlier data on
sources and uses of funds, data on financing of project costs excludes depreciation  as  a source
23of  finance.  Second, the data on project costs relates only to net  capital expenditures and
excludes other uses of funds by firms.
As noted before, this data on financing  of project costs can be compared to the estimates
of Singh and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995).  However, in practice, the estimates shown in
tables 5 and 10 turn out to be different, possibly due to methodological  differences discussed
earlier.'  It is interesting to note that the 28 percent for loans from financial institutions
compared to the 11 percent for loans from banks in table 10 are consistent with the earlier
figures shown in tables 2, 3, and 4 and highlights  the critical role played by development  banks
in Indian capital markets.
The comparison  of project financing  patterns of existing (table 9) and new (table  8) firms
provide some interesting  insights. While internal finance and debentures played a much greater
role in project financing  for existing companies, extemal equity  and loans from FIs played a
much greater role for new companies. 25 Since agency  costs are likely to be greater for existing
firms than new firms, the greater reliance of existing firms on internal finance can be viewed
as broadly supportive  of the managerial  theory of investment  in the Indian context.26  In contrast,
the information-theoretic  approach would have predicted  existing firms to be less dependent  on
4  A comparison  of tables  5 and 10  for the post-1980  period  suggests  that the figures  in table  10 are
closer to the upper quartile  firms in table 5 than the median or the mean firm.
5 This is consistent  with the evidence  in RBI (1995). Based on the analysis of capital  issues for the
1986-87  to 1990-91  period, RBI (1995)  found (convertible)  debentures  to be the primary source of capital
for existing companies  and new equity shares to be the primary source of capital for new companies.
'  In  this context, it  is  interesting to  note that Athey and Laumas  (1994) and Cobham and
Subramaniam  (1995) find internal finance to be relatively  more important for large Indian firms than
small firms. This evidence  is consistent  with the results presented  here, once it is recognized  that existing
firms are likely to be bigger than new firms that are usually small.
24internal finance than new firms since information problems are likely to be lesser for existing
firms than new firms.  A similar analysis for U.S. firms could not be undertaken  in the absence
of  data on  the financing of project costs.  In particular, this would have been useful in
delineating  the relative roles of internal and external finance--especially  equity--in  the financing
of new capital  expenditures  vis-a-vis take-over  of existing  firms.  It is well-known  that the stock
market plays a critical role in takeovers in the U.S. context and the two go in tandem.'
(ii) Absorption  of private capital issues: Table 11 provides  details of firms that issued shares
to finance projects for the 1971-1993  period.  This data reflects the booming of the Indian stock
market in recent years.  The number of issuing firms increased from 57 in 1971 to 121  in 1981
and 426 in 1993. Likewise, the amount issued has gone up from Rs. 423 million  in 1971 to Rs.
984 million 1981 and Rs. 42 billion in  1993.  One indicator of the stock market boom and
maturity is the dramatic increase in the percentage of issues that were underwritten  during the
1990s.  Another interesting aspect is the composition  of share ownership.  For the 1971-93
period, of the 28 percent of issued capital that was subscribed,  promoters contributed some 22
percent, while FIs took up the remaining 6 percent.  Of the remaining 78 percent, the public
subscribed to 53 percent while underwriters took up the remaining 19 percent, mostly as part
of  underwriting obligations. 28 Also,  the  steady increase in  the  percentage of  amount
underwritten  is another indication  of the boom in the Indian stock market in recent years.  It is
27  Among others, Mueller (1987)  has attributed  the wave-like  pattern of mergers  to this tight
relationship  between  the stock  market  and take-overs.
22 This is also  consistent  with  the evidence  in RBI  (1995). Based  on the analysis  of capital  issues  for
the 1986-87  to 1990-91  period,  RBI found public  response  to equity  issues  to be higher compared  to
debenture  issues,  indicating  the  preference  of investors  to the  risk capital  in anticipation  of getting  higher
returns.
25also interesting to note that for the 1971-93 period, the average firms raised about Rs. 0.321
crores from public issues.  Within here,  the Rs.  0.574 crores  for the  1981-93 period is
significantly  higher than the Rs. 0.068 crores for the 1971-80  period. 29
Conclusions and discussion
There are many ways to characterize  the decisions  that firms make regarding the sources
and uses of funds.  The results in this paper suggest  that on the sources of funds side, the firm's
fundamental  choice is between internal and external finance.  Likewise, on the uses of funds
side, the choice is between physical and financial  investments.  Overall, the evidence in this
paper suggest that the stock market plays a very limited  role as a source of finance for Indian
as well as U.S. firms.  The interesting puzzle this finding then poses is that given this limited
financing role of the role of the stock market, why do managers worry so much about share
prices?
On a comparative  basis, the fundamental  difference between firm financing choices in
India and the U.S. relate to the smaller role of internal finance and the bigger role of extemal
debt in  Indian firms compared to  U.S.  firms.  This  result  is  consistent with theoretical
predictions, given that information and agency problems are less  severe for Indian firms
compared to U.S. firms, since the Indian financial  system  is predominantly  a bank-oriented  one
and is closer to Japanese and German financial  systems  than the US and UK financial  systems.
The  arguments presented  in  this  paper  also  suggest that  there  is  a  fundamental
methodological  difference between a  study of sources and use of  funds and a study of the
29  These figures are based on the raw data used for Table 11, taken from the various issues  of RBI's
Report on Currency and Finance.
26financing of net asset growth/capital  expenditures.  While the approach in this paper is of the
former  variety--similar  to Mayer  (1988,  1990), Corbett  and Jenkinson  (1994),  Cobham and
Subramaniam  (1995),  and others--,  the approach of  Singh (1995),  Singh and Hamid (1992),
Prais  (1976),  and others  is of the latter variety.  This  difference is important  since the latter
approach  gives a  much higher estimate  of the role of the stock market  as a source of finance
than the former  approach.
What do these findings imply  for the issue of stock market development in developing
countries?  The comparison of corporate  finance issues for Indian and U.  S. firms suggests that
the role of the stock market as a source of finance is limited and remarkably  similar for Indian
and U.S.  firms,  despite the vastly different nature of capital markets in the two countries. 0 In
broad  terms, India could be classified as a bank-oriented economy and the U.S.  a stock market-
oriented economy, based on the role played by commercial banks and development banks in the
financing  of Indian corporations.
To the extent that these results  for India are generalizable to other developing countries,
it would  seem that the development  of stock  markets is unlikely  to spur  corporate  growth in
developing  countries,  if the analysis is restricted to the role of the stock market as a source of
finance.3'  One important  caveat to  this discussion  of the Indian  stock  market  relates  to the
limited  role  of  foreign  investors  in  the  slow-paced  Indian  privatization  of  state-owned
enterprises.  Other emerging markets  such as Latin America and Eastern  Europe are different
3  Of course, the two economies  do differ with regard to other roles of the stock market such as: (i)
a signalling  device  for managers  with regard  to capital  expenditure  decisions; (ii) the market for corporate
control; and (iii) a mechanism  for corporate governance.
3  Singh (1993) also argues that developing  countries  should attempt to foster bank-based  financial
systems rather than establish and encourage  stock markets.
27in that foreign investors play a much more active role in the privatization process in these
countries through  the stock market. Overall however, foreign  institutional  investors  have started
to more become active in India's capital markets in recent years, despite the tardy progress on
security market reforms related to market microstructure.
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32Table  1: Sources  and  Uses of Funds
Sources of funds  Uses of funds
Internal  Gross fixed assets
Retained earnings  Inventories





Unsecured  loans  & advances
Creditors
Other  current  liabilities
Total
33Table 2: Sources and uses of funds for Medium firms: RBI data,  1972-1991(%)  _  1972-80  1980-91  1972-91
1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  Average  Average  Average
Number of compmnies  1650  1650  1650  1650  1650  1720  1720  1720  1720  1681  1874  1778
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources
Internal  61.1  74.4  52.1  46.0  42.6  45.0  41.9  42.9  43.0  49.9  33.5  41.7
External  38.9  25.6  47.9  54.0  57.4  55.0  58.1  57.1  57.0  50.1  66.5  58.3
Paid-up capital  3.1  2.5  1.4  1.5  2.5  3.4  2.1  2.6  1.9  2.3  S.  1  3.7
Total borrowings  15.9  1.1  16.7  23.0  33.3  26.7  25.3  25.5  27.2  21.6  36.6  29.1
of whichbankborrowing  10.1  -7.5  11.7  17.1  20.4  15.3  12.5  17.4  12.8  12.2  12.0  12.1
Other current liabilities  19.9  22.0  29.7  29.5  21.7  25.0  30.6  29.0  27.9  26.1  24.7  25.4
Uses  _  ___
Gross fixed assets  46.5  65.0  41.9  35.6  57.6  56.4  54.6  48.1  40.1  49.5  50.2  49.9
of which plant and machi  32.6  47.0  30.3  28.2  45.2  40.3  39.9  38.0  30.9  36.9  36.8  36.9
Inventories  36.7  1  9.5  32.5  45.3  13.6  2.7  19.7  33.2  36.9  26.7  19.1  22.9
Other current assets  16.8  15.6  25.6  19.1  28.8  41.0  25.8  18.7  23.1  23.8  30.7  27.3
p-  Table 2: Sources and uses of funds for Medium firms:  RBI data,  1972-1991(%)  1981-91
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991 Average
Number  of compaiies  1720  6--51  1651  1838  1838  1942  1942  1885  1885  2131  2131  1874
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  l100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources
Internal  38.4  29.0  30.5  37.5  39.3  34.6  29.0  36.3  29.0  29.7  35.8  33.5
External  61.6  71.0  69.5  62.5  60.7  65.4  70.9  63.7  71.0  70.3  64.2  66.5
Paid-up capital  0.9  2.1  1.6  4.4  3.5  2.6  3.3  15.8  6.5  6.8  8.9  5.1
Total borrowings  29.1  _  36.9  40.6  40.4  32.8  36.8  39.8  33.9  37.0  41.4  33.9  36.6
of which  bank borrowing  6.3  13.3  9.0  14.0  11.7  13.1  13.6  9.8  19.9  1  1.5  10.4  12.0
Other current liabilities  31.7  32.1  27.3  17.7  24.5  26.1  27.8  14.0  27.5  22.2  21.3  24.7
Uses
Gross fixed assets  47.5  45.6  57.3  61.5  54.7  43.5  53.1  58.7  41.1  38.5  51.0  50.2
of  which  plant andmaclii  32.5  30.4  42.0  50.4  43.1  33.8  42.2  37.9  28.7  31.7  32.3  36.8
Inventories  25.4  29.0  16.0  5.1  15.4  22.9  14.4  16.6  24.0  19.6  21.3  19.1
Other  current assets  27.1  25.4  26.7  33.4  29.9  33.6  32.4  24.7  35.0  41.9  27.7  30.7
Notes: Till 1983, the data is for rwms with paid-up capital upto Rs. 5 lakhs.  After 1983, the data is for various paid-up capital size groups.
Source: Report on Currency  and Finance,  Reserve Bank of India,  Various years_I  I  I  I  _  ITable 3: Sources and  uses of funds  for Large  Indian  firms:  RBI data,  1977-1993 (%)  1977-85
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  Average
Number of companies  415  415  433  433  433  486  486  535  535  463
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources
Internal  49.9  47.8  47.9  44.5  40.6  31.3  33.4  42.9  43.3  42.4
External  50.1  52.2  52.1  55.5  59.4  68.8  66.6  57.1  56.7  57.6
Paid-up capital  3.6  2.3  2.7  2.0  0.8  2.2  1.4  5.5  3.7  2.7
Total borrowings  25.9  23.8  21.3  25.1  27.8  36.3  37.9  40.4  32.9  30.2
of which bank borrowin  13.3  8.2  13.5  10.7  2.2  11.0  7.2  12.6  9.2  9.8
Other current liabilities  20.6  26.1  28.1  28.4  30.8  30.2  27.3  11.2  20.1  24.8
Uses  ____  ___  _
Gross fixed assets  58.2  62.1  52.0  39.4  49.0  46.8  56.6  64.9  56.1  53.9
of which plant and mach  41.6  45.2  42.6  29.9  33.0  30.2  43.8  54.1  44.0  40.5
Inventories  2.0  13.3  32.0  38.0  24.1  28.8  16.5  2.3  16.0  19.2
Other curfent assets  39.8  24.6  16.0  22.5  26.9  24.4  26.9  32.8  27.9  26.9
Table 3: Sources and  uses of funds  for Large  lndian  firms: RBI data,  1977-1993 (%)  1986-93  1977-85  1977-93
w  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  Average  Average  Average
Number of companies  581  581  622  622  645  645  650  650  625  463  544
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources
Internal  36.2  32.7  40.9  35.1  33.2  40.9  29.9  26.3  34.4  42.4  38.4
External  63.9  67.3  59.1  64.9  66.8  59.1  70.1  73.7  65.6  57.6  61.6
Paid-up capital  2.3  3.2  18.5  4.9  7.3  8.9  7.9  23.0  9.5  2.7  6.1
Total borrowings  36.7  37.0  33.6  35.2  39.3  29.5  40.9  36.5  36.1  30.2  33.1
of which bank borrowin  11.9  11.7  8.9  15.7  8.8  9.4  9.0  10.9  10.8  9.8  10.3
Other current liabilities  24.9  27.1  7.0  24.7  20.2  20.7  21.3  14.2  20.0  24.8  22.4
Uses
Gross fixed assets  44.3  54.4  62.1  42.5  37.9  50.9  49.6  54.0  49.5  53.9  51.7
of which plant and mach  34.5  44.6  41.2  28.7  31.2  31.9  28.5  47.9  36.1  40.5  38.3
Inventories  21.9  12.9  14.3  25.5  19.1  22.4  14.6  16.4  18.4  19.2  18.8
Other current assets  33.8  32.7  23.5  32.0  43.0  26.7  35.8  29.6  32.1  26.9  29.5
Note: Data is for firms with paid-up  capital  of Rs. 1 crore and  above
Source: Report  on Currency  and  Finance,  Reserve  Bank of India,  Various years  _Table  4: Sources of uses and funds of  Medium and Large firms:  ICICI data.  1978-1993  (%I  |  Average
1977-78  1978-79  1979-80  1980-81  1981-82  1982-83  11983-84  1984-85  1978-85
Number of compani  417  417  417  417  417  417  417  417  417
Sources  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Internal  38.6  41.6  34.9  37.2  30.2  33.4  39.5  42.1  37.2
Depreciation  29.7  25.2  18.9  20.3  15  16.6  23.7  26.3  22.0
Reserves and surplu  8.9  16.4  16  16.9  15.2  16.8  15.8  15.8  15.2
External  61.4  58.4  65  1  62.8  69.8  66.6  60.5  57.9  62.8
Paid-up capital  10.2  6.1  4  4  4.2  2.8  - 4.1  2.4  4.7
Debentures  1.4  1  2.2  4.9  3.2  8.9  11.5  15.9  6.1
L-T borrowings  10.4  _  9.4  11.5  12  15.2  17.5  14.5  8.9  12.4
Bank borrowings  for  1.5  10.3  11.9  3.9  10.3  4.4  7.5  7  7.1
Unsecured loans an  13.2  __  3.6  2.8  9.3  8.2  9.3  8.2  3.4  7.3
Creditors  16.5  29.6  25.9  27.3  24.1  22.3  10.2  16.9  21.6
Other current  liabiliti  8.2  ___  -1.6  6  .8  1.4  4.6  1.4  4.1  3  3.5
Uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Gross fixed  assets  61.6  53.5  40.7  54.2  46.5  58.2  62.2  53.5  53.8
Inventories  12.4  29.3  36.5  24.5  25.9  14.8  8.2  15.9  20.9
Other current  assets  26  17.2  22.8  21.3  27.6  27  29.6  30.6  25.3
Table  4:  Sources of uses and funds  of Medium and Large firms  (%}  Average  Average  Average
1985-86  198 6 -87 1987-88  1988-89  1989-90  1990-91  1991-92  1992-93  1986-93  1978-85  1978-93
Number of compani  417  417  532  532  620  620  620  620  547  417  482
Sources  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Intemal  37.0  31.6  48.7  36.0  32.8  41.7  37.0  39.5  38.0  37.2  37.6
Depreciation  19.3  18.9  26.8  19.4  16.2  18.2  14.2  15.3  18.5  22.0  20.3
Reserves and surplu  17.7  12.7  21.9  16.6  16.6  23.5  22.8  24.2  19.5  15.2  17.4
External  67.0  68.4  51.3  64.0  37.2  58.3  63.0  60.5  58.7  62.8  60.8
Paid-up capital  2.3  3.8  8.6  3.5  3.5  3.8  2.9  5.9  4.3  4.7  4.5
Debentures  15.2  21.9  4.8  4.8  13.0  9.9  8.5  12.0  11.3  6.1  8.7
L-T borrowings  4.3  10.1  13.0  10.8  14.5  11.6  17.4  20.0  12.7  12.4  12.6
Bank borrowings  for  9.0  9.0  4.4  14.7  7.6  7.1  6.5  9.2  8.4  7.1  7.8
Unsecured loans an  6.5  5.5  3.0  4.7  5.1  5.2  9.3  1.7  5.1  7.3  6.2
Creditors  22.9  10.1  14.4  19.3  15.6  12.4  13.9  9.3  14.7  21.6  18.2
Other current liebiliti  2.3  |  7.6  2.6  5.8  7.4  7.9  4.0  2.0  5.0  3.5  4.2
Uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Gross fixed  assets  46.6  56.9  68.6  45.1  41.9  55.4  57.0  54.1  53.2  53.8  53.5
Inventories  22.6  1  12.6  12.1  21.5  17.5  18.2  12.8  15.3  16.6  20.9  18.8
Other current  assets  30.8  |  30.5  19.2  33.3  40.4  16.2  30.  30.4  28.9  25.3  27.1
Source:  Financial Performance  of Companies,  ICICI.  Various  years.  I  . ._Table 5: India:  Top 100 Listed Companies in Manufacturing,  1980-1990
Quartile  Distributions of Indicators  of Financing of Corporate Growth:  After
Tax Retention Ratio, Internal  and External  Financing of Growth
Retention ratio  Internal  External  External  debt
(%)  rmance (%)  equity (%)  (%)
Minimum  14.8  -89.5  -31.8  -9.8
Lower  Quartile  55.0  23.9  3.6  24.2
(Q1)
Median  (Q2)  68.0  38.1  16.3  38.9
Upper  Quartile  76.2  62.0  31.5  57.8
(Q3)
Maximum  (Q4)  99.9  113.0  79.6  110.0
Mean  65.7  40.5  19.6  39.9
Standard  15.0  32.8  21.9  24.4
deviation
Skewness  -0.60  -0.80  0.67  0.29
Kurtosis  0.59  3.10  0.57  -0.01
Source:  Table B-2,  Singh (1995).
37Table  6: Sources and uses of funds for U.S. firms: 1972-1992 (%)  Average  Average  Average
_  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1972-80  1981-92  1972-92
Numberof companies  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources  _
Internal  59.2  50.8  41.8  60.8  55.3  56.2  48.3  49.5  53.8  52.9  51.7  52.3
Depreciation  27.8  20.6  16.1  23.7  22.8  26.0  22.1  18.7  20.3  22.0  30.3  26.1
Reserves and surplus  31.4  30.2  25.7  37.1  32.5  30.2  26.2  30.8  33.5  30.8  21.4  26.1
External  40.8  49.3  58.2  39.1  44.8  43.8  51.7  50.4  46.2  47.1  48.3  47.7
Extermal  equity  7.3  4.3  4.0  6.7  5.4  3.5  2.8  1.5  3.8  4.4  3.6  4.0
Debentures  5.8  _  11  5.8  15.4  8.0  3.5  0.9  0.3  -3.3  4.2  1.8  3.0
Long-termn  borrowings  4.5  5.0  6.4  10.4  0.6  7.0  12.4  7.0  16.3  7.7  11.9  9.8
Other current liabilities  7.9  18.0  20.8  -11.3  14.2  10.5  17.7  18.4  9.6  11.8  15.5  13.6
Other liabilities  4.9  6.7  6.4  11.4  7.6  10.3  7.4  8.6  13.0  8.5  11.6  10.0
Creditors  10.4  14.2  14.8  6.5  9.0  9.0  10.5  14.6  6.8  10.6  4.0  7.3
Uses  _
Gross fLxed  assets  39.6  32.2  34.9  61.8  44.7  49.0  48.0  46.7  57.3  46.0  50.8  48.4
Inventories  11.8  22.4  33.3  -1.2  17.5  18.3  16.5  20.3  14.6  17.1  6.5  11.8
Other current assets  48.6  45.4  31.9  39.4  37.9  32.7  35.5  33.0  28.1  36.9  42.7  39.8
0  Table 6: Sources and uses  of funds ror  U.S. firms: 1972-1992  (%)  _  _ 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992
Number of companies  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510  510
Total sources/uses  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Sources 
Internal  49.4  64.0  61.0  52.4  43.2  55.8  64.9  34.0  33.3  48.5  61.6  51.8
Depreciation  21.2  42.4  36.5  26.1  31.7  37.3  34.8  13.7  22.6  26.4  36.4  33.9
Reserves and surplus  28.2  21.6  24.5  26.3  11.5  18.5  30.1  20.3  10.7  22.1  25.2  17.9
External  50.5  35.9  38.9  47.6  56.9  44.2  35.2  66.0  66.6  51.5  38.4  48.2
External equity  9.2  8.7  11.2  -3.9  1.4  2.6  -2.3  -5.7  4.2  -1.2  5.2  13.2
Debentures  3.0  2.7  3.0  3.5  2.8  1.3  0.6  -0.1  1.1  1.6  2.9  -0.3
Long-term borrowings  13.4  19.1  -1.7  17.0  12.4  15.6  5.5  14.9  21.9  10.0  17.9  -3.4
Other current liabilities  8.7  -3.0  3.9  15.4  16.8  18.3  8.3  41.1  23.8  25.4  6.6  20.2
Creditors  11.6  18.1  12.5  11.6  16.2  11.3  13.8  10.5  7.4  6.7  5.3  14.3
Other liabilities  4.6  -9.7  10.0  4.0  7.3  4.9  9.3  5.3  8.2  9.0  0.5  4.2
Uses
Gross fixed assets  65.4  121.6  40.2  39.7  51.0  18.5  30.4  18.6  37.2  36.8  81.9  68.3
Inventories  12.1  -26.4  -8.3  20.1  13.4  6.7  15.1  7.2  10.6  9.8  8  - .8  9
Other current assets  22.5  4.8  68.0  40.3  35.6  74.8  54.5  74.2  52.2  53.3  9.3  22.6
Source: Computations  based on Standard and  Poor's COMPUSTAT database  _Table  7: Summary  of rmancing patterns  (%)
(I) Sources  and  uses of funds
Medium firms  Large  firms  All firms  All firms
Intemal____  (RBI)  (RBI)  (ICICI)  (COMPUSTAT)
Intemnal
finance  41.7  38.4  37.6  51.0
External  debt  29.1  33.1  20.4  9.8
External
equity  3.7  6.1  4.5  4.0
Time-period  1972-91  |  1977-93  1981-93  D1972-92
NT  1778  543  497  504
Source: Based on tables 2, 3, 4,  6
39Table 8:  Financing  of  project  cost  of  New  Indian  companies:  1971-1984f%)  _  1  . _-  Average
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1971-84
Number of  companies  21  27  37  84  29  so  41  40  48  69  95  168  290  409  101
Share ca-ital2lndian5  25.9  31.4  35.9  37.0  33.8  34.8  33.7  29.9  36.5  33.5  35.0  26.9  38.8  39.3  33.7
Share capitallForaignl  _  8.4  0.6  0.4  0.1  0.0  0.0  10  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.8
Reserves and surplus  0_  3.7  1.3  1.0  0.3  i  _0.4  0.1  _1.1  0.0  2.4  0.1  0.2  1.3  2.0  1.0
Subsidy from central  govt.  0.0  _  0.0  0.1  0.2  0.4  0.7  1.3  0.1  1.4  1.9  2.2  0.7  1.4  1.3  0.8
Debentures/Bondr  0.0  0.0  1.2  0.0  0.0  I  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.0  4.4  0.0  0.0  4.4  2.5  0.9
Deferred  payments  2.1  0.2  0.5  2.3  2.4  _  2.6  1.2  0.2  0.8  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.5  1.1  1.0
Loans from  Financial Institutions  6.4  33.1  37.3  30 8  26.3  39.4  47.6  50.4  51.5  49.9  56.7  49.3  41.7  43.2  40.3
Loans from  banks  3.5  24.5  22.1  23.6  34.6  18.1  9.7  16.4  7.9  7.4  4.2  15.9  10.0  4.9  14.5
Loans from  directors  and friends  0.0  0.0  |  0.0  0.9  0.6  |  1.6  4.2  0.5  1.1  0.4  0.9  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.8
Loans from  other  sources  53.6  _6.6  1.2  4.2  1.7  2.3  0.9  1.0  0.8  0.1  0.8  6.7  1.5  0.4  5.8
Total  100.0  I  1000  1.000.  1100.0  -100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0-  100.0  I  100.0  100.0  I  100.0  100.0
Source: Report  of  Currency  and FInce,  Rese  Bank  of  India,  Various years  _  1  o  o  o  ,ooo_*ooo_*ooo  __*oo__o_o1_o__10o
CTable 9: Financing of project  cost  of Existin  Indian companies:  1971-19841%)  _  _  J  |  __  Average
g  P  k  |  1971  1972  _  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  _1984  1971-84
Number of companies  36  21  24  474  30  33  28  40  32  27  26  76  63  32  37
Share capitalfindian)  27.1  6.3  13.3  35.7  _  27.1  33.5  18.9  22.2  21.7  60.3  10.2  9.5  10.5  34.3  23.6
Share capital(Foreign  _  1.4  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.3  0.7  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.3
Reserves and surplus  9.5  4.5  36.7  7.1  _13.9  15.6  10.5  19.4  0 0  2.3  43.0  11.4  19.6  9.3  14.5
Subsidy from central govt.  0.0  0.0  _  0.0  0.2  0.4  o.o  _  o0.2  0.1  0.6  0.3  0.5  0.1  0.5  0.9  _  0.3
Debentures/Bonds  7.2  1.9  8.8  7.2  9.3  0.2  0.0  1.4  1.8  0.0  24.7  32.3  45.4  20.1  11.4
Deferred payments  5.6  0.7  0.2  1.8  0.0  1.0  10.8  1.7  1.4  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.6  1.4  1.8
Loans from  Financial Institutions  15.1  8.1  16.4  32.0  33.1  30.9  _  7.5  21.6  49.9  18.9  14.7  19.2  17.7  21.3  21.9
Loans from  banks  19.9  0.6  24.3  _  14.5  14.5  17.6  24.0  19.7  6.0  17.5  3.0  23.2  5.6  5.3  14.0
Loans from directors  and friends  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.5  0_  _  0.2  0.3  0.8  0.0  0.0  2.3  0.1  0.0  _0.3
Loans from other  sources  14.3  1.5  0.2  1.3  1.7  0.6  27.5  13.3  17.0  0.6  3.6  1.7  0.0  0.4  6.0
Total  100 0  100.0  100 0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
,Source:  Report of Currency  and Finance, Reserve Bank of  India, Various yearTable  10: Financing of project  cost of All  Indian companies:  1971-19931%)l  _  Average  Average  Average
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1971-80  1981-93  1971-93
Number of companies  57  48  61  131  59  83  69  80  80  96  76  299  188
Share capital(lndian)  26.4  17.1  19.1  36.4  30.5  34.3  27.3  26.1  29.5  41.7  28.8  36.6  32.7
Share capital(Foreign)  5.1  0.5  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.8  0.4  0.3  0.0  0.7  0.2  0.5
Reserves and surplus  4.4  4.2  27.7  3.9  6.8  6.4  4.6  10.1  0.0  2.4  7.0  5.5  6.2
Subsidy from  central  govt.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.4  0.4  0.8  0.1  1.1  1.4  0.4  0.8  0.6
Debentures/Bonds  3.3  1.1  6.9  3.5  4.5  0.1  0.2  0.7  0.9  3.1  2.4  16.3  9.3
Deferred  payments  3.8  0.5  0.3  2.0  1.2  2.0  5.4  1.0  1.1  0.0  1.7  0.5  1.1
Loans from  Financial Institutions  10.4  18.9  21.8  31.3  29.5  36.1  30.1  36.3  50.7  40.4  30.6  26.1  28.4
Loans from  banks  11.1  10.9  23.7  19.2  24.9  17.9  15.9  18.0  7.0  10.5  15.9  5.9  10.9
Loans from  directors  and friends  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.5  0.4  1.1  2.4  0.4  1.0  0.3  0.6  2.1  1.3
Loans from  other  sources  35.5  3.7  0.5  2.8  1.7  1.7  12.5  7.0  8.4  0.3  7.4  5.7  6.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Table  10:  Financing  of  project  cost  of  All  Indian  companies:  1971-1993(l%)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Number of companies  121  244  353  441  395  676  385  119  178  262  130  159  426
Share capital(lndian)  18.8  18.7  24.7  38.7  35.7  38.8  28.5  47.5  22.8  51.5  53.6  44.7  52.1
Share capital(Foreign)  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.0  1.0  1.1
Reserves and surplus  28.2  5.5  10.5  2.8  6.0  1.5  3.8  2.5  2.0  0.6  2.2  3.2  2.0
>  Subsidy from  central  govt.  1.1  0.4  1.0  1.2  1.2  1.3  0.9  0.7  0.3  0.1  1.9  0.3  0.3
rQ  Debentures/Bonds  16.2  __  15.2  24.8  4.4  7.9  6.1  22.2  11.7  30.1  32.4  14.8  14.8  10.7
Deferred  payments  0.1  0.1  0.6  1.1  1.1  0.6  0.3  0.3  0.7  0.2  0.0  0.3  0.7
Loans from  Financial Institutions  29.2  35.2  29.7  40.8  31.4  37.0  31.6  26.4  19.0  9.6  16.2  20.0  13.6
Loans from  banks  3.4  19.3  7.8  5.0  5.7  5.7  7.5  4.4  4.0  1.9  3.5  6.0  1.9
Loans from  directors  and friends  0.3  1.2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.3  0.5  0.7  0.6  0.3  4.6  5.7  12.1
Loans from  other sources  2.7  4.3  0.8  0.4  10.9  8.9  4.7  5.7  20.5  3.1  3.1  3.9  5.6
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
Source:  Report  of  Currency  and  Finance.  Reserve  Bank  of  India,  Various  years  . -Table 11:  Absorption  of Privet  capital  issues:  India, 1971-19931%)  I/1  1971-80  1981-93  1971-93
1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  Average  Average  Average
Number  of comanies  57  48  61  131  59  83  69  80  80  96  76  299  188
Amount issued(il  + II)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
I. Subcribed  21.2  12.7  9.5  16.5  8.3  12.0  16.8  20.3  19.6  22.3  15.9  39.7  27.8
By Promoters  etc.  20.7  9.3  7.6  9.7  6.1  9.0  12.8  14.4  16.3  17.2  12.3  32.6  22.4
By Govt.  Financial Institutions  0.5  3.5  2.0  6.8  2.2  3.0  3.9  5.9  3.4  5.2  3.6  7.2  5.4
II. Offered  to  public  78.8  87.3  90.5  83.5  91.7  88.0  83.2  79.7  80.4  77.7  84.1  60.2  72.2
Subcribed  by public  other than  underwrit  45.3  63.2  47.5  56.8  50.5  44.6  45.2  42.9  60.1  64.1  52.0  53.9  53.0
Subcribed  by underwriters  32.7  23.9  42.7  24.7  41.1  43.4  36.9  34.8  20.2  13.4  31.4  5.9  18.6
as investors  16.1  8.4  32.7  9.5  21.8  26.9  20.6  7.8  3.3  6.6  15.4  1.5  8.5
as part  of underwriting  obligations  16.6  15.5  10.0  15.2  19.3  16.5  16.3  27.0  16.9  6.9  16.0  4.6  10.3
left  unsubcribed  0.7  0.2  0.4  2.0  0.1  #VALUE!  1.2  1.9  0.1  0.2  #VALUEI  0.2  #VALUEI
Ill.  Amount  underwritten  72.2  82.7  83.1  79.8  85.1  85.4  73.5  73.8  61.5  60.4  75.7  43.4  59.6
Ill  ar percentage  of 11  91.7  94.8  91.8  95.6  92.8  97.1  88.3  92.6  72.2  77.8  89.5  71.1  80.3
Table  11: Absorption  of Private capital  issues: India,  1971-1993  1%)
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993
Number  of comanies  121  244  353  441  395  676  385  119  178  262  130  159  426
Amount  issued(I + l)  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
I. Suboribed  24.7  28.4  42.4  32.9  41.9  35.8  45.6  43.8  34.8  59.9  55.0  52.6  19.0
By Promoters  etc.  22.5  24.5  39.9  28.2  26.4  29.3  24.0  38.3  28.6  56.9  45.0  41.9  17.9
By Govt.  Financial  Institutions  2.2  3.9  2.6  4.6  15.5  6.5  21.6  5.5  6.3  2.9  10.0  10.7  1.1
II. Offered  to public  75.3  71.6  57.6  67.1  58.1  64.2  54.4  56.2  65.2  40.1  45.0  47.4  81.0
P  Subcribed  by  public  other than  underwrit  66.7  61.9  43.9  59.1  52.8  63.6  49.1  46.3  61.0  38.3  43.2  47.3  67.8
Subcribed  by underwriters  8.5  9.7  12.4  8.0  5.3  0.6  5.0  9.7  0.7  1.7  1.8  0.1  13.2
as investors  2.1  3.0  3.7  0.2  0.0  __0.0  3.5  3.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.1  4.0
as part  of underwriting  obligations  6.3  6.8  8.7  7.8  5.3  0.6  1.5  6.5  3.5  1.5  1.8  0.0  9.2
left  unsubcribed  0.2  0.0  1.3  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.0  0.2  0.0  0.0  0.3
III. Amount  underwritten  42.8  62.0  45.6  44.7  43.3  41.0  33.0  34.6  26.0  12.7  42.0  46.8  90.1
Ill as percentage  of 11  56.8  86.6  79.2  66.7  74.4  63.8  60.6  61.5  39.9  31.6  93.4  98.8  111.3
Source:  Report on Currency  and Finance, Reserve Bank of  India, Various  years.  _Policy Research Working Paper Series
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